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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
according to the findings of necessity by the jury, that the castle doctrine
would afford. The killing was wanton, and it was proper to punish it fully.
R. J. H., '30.
HOMICIDE-INSANITY AS AFFECTING DEGREE op Gu=LT.-The defendant
was charged with murder and entered two pleas: not guilty, and not guilty
by reason of insanity. In a preliminary trial upon the latter plea, accused
was found sane. Held, it was not error to reject evidence of the defend-
ant's mental condition, offered to reduce the grade of the homicide under
the plea of not guilty. People v. Troche (Cal., 1928), 273 P. 767. The
doctrine of partial insanity is not recognized by the courts of California.
and insanity is a complete defense or none at all.
While this, no doubt, is the majority view and prevails both in those
states where the defense of insanity is available under a plea of not guilty
and in those where such a defense must be specially pleaded, the courts
generally have allowed evidence of intoxication and of "heat of blood," not
as a complete defense to homicide, but to indicate a condition of the mind
which renders it incapable of sustaining the deliberation and premeditation
necessary to support a charge of first degree murder. State v. Sporegrove
(1907), 134 Ia. 599, 112 N. W. 83; Commonwealth v. Colando (1911), 281
Pa. St. 343, 80 A. 571. Furthermore, the law which recognizes but one de-
gree of insanity has never precluded the introduction of evidence as to the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the commission of the crime when
presented together with the surrounding circumstances to reveal a lack of
the requisite intent in the defendant. Sage v. State (1883), 91 Ind. 141.
Thus it seems inconsistent and a matter purely of terminology to refuse to
recognize insanity which will lower the degree of crime for which a per-
son may be held responsible and at the same time to permit the condition
of the defendant's mind as influenced by outside circumstances to be shown
for the purpose of determining the gravity of the offense committed.
Notwithstanding the very simple "right and wrong" test as applied by
the majority of the courts, insanity is difficult of precise definition and
covers a variety of mental diseases, only the minority of which constitute
legal irresponsibility. Because of this and the tendency, whether conscious
or unconscious, of juries to permit a lay conception of insanity to influence
them, they have declared, in the face of obvious knowledge in the defend-
ant of right and wrong, such defendant insane. By the adoption of the
doctrine of partial insanity, which allows a reduction in the degree of the
crime charged, the liberation of persons who are not legally insane would
be somewhat diminished, if not entirely eliminated.
There are at least two states which have recognized the doctrine of partial
insanity. The supreme court of Utah in State v. Anselmo (1915), 46 Utah
137, 148 P. 1071, holds: "In determining the question of such design and
premeditation, they [the jury] should take into consideration all the facts
and circumstances developed at the trial as well as those relating to the
mental condition including that of intoxication of the accused where such
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evidence has been introduced." The court further states "A person's men-
tal condition may not be such as to make him irresponsible for his acts and
yet it may be such as to relieve him from the extreme penalty imposed by
the law for the committed act." In a more recent case of State v. Schilling
(N. J., 1920), 112 A. 400, the New Jersey Supreme Court approved the
following charge to the jury: "[If] at the time of doing the act, the evi-
dence shows you that the defendant was so feeble-minded that his faculties
were prostrated and rendered him incapable of forming the specific intent
to kill with its wilful, deliberate and premeditated character, then although
it is no defense or justification, his offense would be murder in the second
degree." While these decisions are not in accord with the majority view,
they are indicative of a progressive spirit, and have at least refused to
shackle a particular case with inflexible tests which can not possibly be ap-
propriate generally. F. E. M., '30.
JuDiciAL NOTICE-LAws OF ANOTHER STATE.-In a suit in a Missouri
Court to have a decree of divorce granted in Illinois declared invalid and to
secure separate maintenance, the plaintiff offered evidence of statutes of
Illinois to show that the divorce judgment obtained there by publication was
void. Held, this evidence was inadmissible. "Where the cause of action
rests upon the laws of another state, and the same are not merely an evi-
dential part of the cause of action, they must be both pleaded and proved."
Keena v. Keena (Mo. 1928), 10 S. W. (2d) 344.
At common law, courts of the several states being considered as foreign
to one another, are not bound to take judicial notice of the laws of any
other state. Statutes of other states are regarded as matters of fact, and
when relied on to support a cause of action or defense must be pleaded and
proved as other facts. Fidelity Loan Securities Co. v. Moore (1919), 280
Mo. 315, 217 S. W. 286. This common doctrine prevailed in Missouri until
an act was passed in 1927 providing: "In every action or proceeding where-
in the law of another state of the United States of America is pleaded, the
courts of this state shall take judicial notice of the public statutes and
judicial decisions." In deciding the principal case, the Missouri Court of
Appeals apparently disregarded this piece of constructive legislation, for
all of the cases cited and relied on by the court were decided prior to the
enactment of this statute. It is an unquestioned rule that a court will take
judicial notice of the statutes of its own state. Lyons v. Reinecke (1926),
10 F. (2d) 3; Dortch v. Reichel Motor Co. (Mo. A. 1920), 223 S. W. 675;
Moore v. Clem (Tex. A. 1927), 295 S. W. 941. Apparently the only ex-
cuse the Missouri court can offer for failing to employ the statute in ques-
tion is the fact that it overlooked it entirely. Had the court heeded this
statute, proof would have been unnecessary, for judicial notice is the cog-
nizance of certain facts which judges and jurors already know. United
States v. Hammers (1917), 241 F. 542. In deciding the principal case
without regard to the statute the Missouri court ignored the modern ten-
dency to abandon the cumbersome machinery used in most of the states.
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